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T BASIS.
^ p v Q ^
5

n

The duty to determine the facts has been delegated to the
The realistic interpretation of the facts and circumstances in evidence i
essentail to the successful operation of thepidxr.'.-".". In its search for the
ard has the rights to consider the interest of the witness (s); the probabil
orbability of his insertions in liqht of proved or admitted facts; the
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all the surrounding circumstances; the conditons
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PLAINTIFF PETTTICN ?C?. RFHFAHITG

. h i s i s a p e t i t i o n by p l a i n t i f f / a p p e l l a n t ,

riichsra ,-toussy (hereinafter,

Looeiieiant) controverting trie c e c i s i c n cf the ^carc of Review: ci

--> a

I'/TIVC"")-

xm^issicn t h a t t h e r e was a conspiracy t o unlawfully ieau p witness by the
industrial Commission of Utah and forged exhibits by the I n d u s t r i a l Cc_rmissic
;f Utah, and the I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah did i n s t r u c t Kr. S i l e r t c perj
dmself for monetary gain, 76-6-503, 76-5-101, 76-6-412, 76-8-414, 76-5-511,
The I n d u s t r i a l Commission fo Utah a l s o denied the p l a i n t i f f » .
:>. S i l e r s work r e c o r d s ,

Huusay,

Also the I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah hag never

stated what was a t r i s k monetarily for >jr. Rcusay.

Arguments of the plaintiff were heard by ALJ Kenneth A. Major.

From

i findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision of the Tribunal affirmi
i Department's Decision Review Representative's decision, appellant filed a
cion for review bv defendant/respondent Commission (hereinafter Commission).
e Commission adopted the findings of fact and

conclusion of law of the ALJ.

.e Plaintiff herebv anneals from the decision regarding unemployment contribi
.ability set forth by the Commission.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The appellant seeks a reversal of the Commission's affirmation
of the ALJ!s findings of fact, conclusion of law and order, that the appe
is liable for unemployment contributions for unemployment benefits to be
paid to the claimant, Cecil P. Siler, or any other solicitors and delive
(unidentified and un-named) ; and that the substance and validity of the
independent contactor's agreement be held to be valid and sufficient~in
holding its signatories not within the scope of the Utah Employment Sea
Act, and that the appellant not be held to be an employer, and Chat-the
Court issue an order barring further harrassment of the appellant by tt
Employment Security Division.

H E ALJ AND COMMISSION ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IGNORED
LMAIIC VIOLATIONS OF
THE APPELLANTS CONSTITUTIONAL
CS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE DESIGNED TO-PROTECT TEE APPELLANT FROM
\G HIS PROPERTY OR RESOURCES WITHOUT DUE PROCESS.

Mr. Rousay, the Appellant, is accused of being Mr. Siler!s
Dyer.

The allegation arises, according to the Statement of Facts,

forms that Mr. Siler allegedly filled out, or which were completed
lis.

\:LX^^>V-

^

Despite Mr. RousayTs efforts to clarify the independant
ractor relationship with the Employment Security employees, they
Evans in particular) continued to badger and harass Mr. Rousay
Dut showing cause.
when Mr. Rousay asked for a statement of the exact nature of the
stigation of his private matters, Mr. Rousay was served with a
Dena

(Aug 10, 1984).

Yet at no time was Mr. Rousay informed of his

:s, warned of the possibility of self-incrimination, or told the
it of penalties, charges, fees, or risk of imprisonment that might
/e from the allegations.
Mr. Pvousay has never been presented with a specific list of names
Lleged employees for which he is being held liable for unemployment
cibution. Mr. Rousay has never received a statement as to what is at
in this process. Yet, the §tate was able to obtain subpoenas
Dut specifying such details.

Apparently, it is well within the authority

le State to conduct a !lwitch hunt11.

If a private citizen is suspected of

Dying individuals, the State may require the individual to produce
nents and evidence, and to be compelled to provide evidence against TneiA^ute

Employment Security, the ALJ, and the Commission had the
opportunity to subpoena other witnesses or individuals who were alleged
:o have business relations with Mr. Rousay.
transcripts and the attachments thereto*
have them testify*

Their names appear in the

Yet, the respondants failed to

Rather, it seems the respondents prefer to compel

the only two witnesses in the case, Mr. Siler, and Mr. Rousay, to
testify as

the respondants would have them do. Despite ample

statements and testomony that it was never the intention of either party
of function ins an employer-employee relationship, and that they routinely
reaffirmed that intention by signing affadavits to that effect, the
ALJ and the Commission persisted in their Unsupported conclusions—and
then broadened their conclusions to include persons they didn!t bother
to have testify.

z
THE ALJ AND COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO DEFINE THE
1C0PE OF THE HEARING AND TO EXPLAIN WHY THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS
)F THE SILER MATTER SHOULD BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE ALL OTHER INDIVIDUALS
JITH M O M THE APPELLANT MAY HAVE HAD BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS,

The Statement of Fact clearly shows that Mr. Rousay had been
round by the Employment Security Division to NOT be an employer of other
individuals.

Yet, without any explanation as to why there is any

connection between Mr. Siler's case and any other potential applicant,
the ALJ and Commission conclude that Mr. Rousay is an employer.

2.

This is patently absurd.

Mr. Rousay cannot be both an employer

ot an employer of the same person-or persons.

Since he has already

declared to be NOT an employer of Mr. Crabtree and others, Mr. Rousav
t, therefore be their employer on the basis of a later hearing.

This

seems to have completely escaped the ALJ.
The attorney for the respondent argues that because Mr.Rousar
to meet the A B C test11 Mr. Siler was, therefore Mr. Rousay!s employee.
re, however, is there an argument which explains why if Mr. Siler is
found to be an employee of Mr. Rousay on the basis of the inform
sented in this case why anyone else should be considered an employee. At
point does the ALJ or the Commission make any effort to broaden the inquiry
ond the specific facts of the Siler case. Yet, precipitously and without
tification, the ALJ and

the Commission broaden their conclusions

apply to all other relationships, as if th& facts of the Siler lease were
unique.
Many statements in the transcripts point to the contrary.
.ationship with Mr. Rousay was unique.

Mr. Sile

Not only was Mr. Siler coached in

application, he was, of, those considered by the Commission,
;t shown to be self-employed.

Yet it is from this case that the ALJ and

-mission wish to generalize!

3

It was

alleg;ea

that Mr. Siler delivered tickets orimarilv en

lis own slaes, or when there xvas insufficient deliverymen to to make his
deliveries,

when Mr. Siler was -asked to estimate the amount of time he

:ock in making those deliveries.

The attorney for the respondent prompted

iim. Mr. Siler later agreed that his estimate (which sounded very treeise)
ras really aMwild guessn.
In fact, the record shows that Mr. Siler spent 2-3 hours Der dav
taking deliveries.

If this were only seven to eight percent of his time,

[r. Siler was working well over thirty hours per day.
The truth is that Mr. Siler devoted a very high percentage of his
;ime making deliveries, averaging 50-75 miles per day.
rere made in residential areas, Mr.

As all deliveries

Siler wouldhave had to been a superior

Lavigator, driven at excessive speeds and never tarried for more than a fews
seconds at the door in order to have spent only 7 or 8 percent of his time
_n delivery.
This nonsensical acceptance of wild estimates on the part of the
"ommission as "factual11 is evidence that the Commission is incompetent to cons
:he evidence before them or so highly biased as to be willing to accept the
1

guided" utterances of a amnesiac as sufficient upon which to base their

conclusions.

This suggest that the Commission has little discernment as to

:he what is. acceptable evidence.

Heresay and wild guesses appear to .be fair

THUS THEIR CONCLUSIONS CANNOT BE VALID AND THEIR ARGUMENTS ARE
JT BASIS.

"Mr. Siler performed all of his solicitation services an
iaintiff's business with the exception cf a project involving
of clam choder tickets.M
The apparent intent of the statement is to imply that Mr. Siler did
.e outside of Mr. Rousay!s office., which in turn implies control by
:ous ay.
In fact, the true nature of the relationship is just the opcsite.
>iler requested to make calls from Mr. Rousay's office.
M

I made the calls there because it was more convenient.11

Mr. Siler not only telephoned form his home, hired family
^rs to help, distributed pamplets or flyers, and performed administrative
Hions, at his home.

"Mr. Siler, as did other solicitors, worked regular hours during a day
vening shift.n

This is patently false. Mr. Siler worked his own hours

he came and went as he chose.

The Commission offers no support for a

lusion that others worked in regulated hours.
warranted.

Such as conclusion is

In fact the Commission contradicts this statement by

:luding t!,The plaintiff did not keep records of the hours worked or require
solicotors to report a precise time by punching a time clock."

The use

:he word "precise" implies they may have had general requirements. This

5

3 required by other solicitors to be on hand when THEY wanted to use
RousayTs office at THEIR convenience.
m e Utah Lmpiovment Security Act defines wages as "any remuneration f
vices including commissions, bonuses, oiece rate, slary. etc.M

The cuesticn

ore the Court is not whether such "wages" were paid, but by whom, to whom-,
for what services.
Contrary to the implications of the reasonaine adopted bv the
nissicn in this case, consenting adults enter into agreements on a routine
is in the State of Utah in which -there is no perceived or intended
ter-servant relationship.

If you xvould believe the Commission there is

7 one universe and that universe is made uo of two sets, employers and
Lovees (masters, and servants).

This world view is utterly inane.

Tare are many transactions involving remuneration which have
searing whatsoever on the concept of wages, and defined or intended uner
Employment Security Act.

Stock brokers buy and sell stock for their

snts without every becoming employees.

Carptenters, plumbers and

sr tradesmen routinely perform services without becoming employees of
general contractor.

Librarians search for information! for library

tons without becoming employees of the specific person who requests the
Drmation.

Bankers perform many services for their clients on a routine,

i daily basis without ever becoming employees,, and are well-paid in the
n of interest earnings for the trust placed in them.
To ignore the thousands upon thousands of ad hoc joint ventures by
Die who are linked often my TSEXE no more than a telephone line or a
puter seems to beg the issue of employment altogether.

Telecommunation

come a wav or m e ,

tie or sne wno owns a teiepnone can be easily

f employed as the delivery boy with
th a box and a can of paste.

a bicvcle, or the shoe shine

Indeed, telemarketing is a multimiilion

business and there is ample evidence to suggest that old definitions
ace of employ" no longer apply.
The appellant repeatedly suffered long delays between hearings,
m was given only a short time to prepare for the specific allegaqtions
Ln the hearings.
while the hearing hotice gave the appellant
lest his witnesses j it was not until the final
J that the issues of the case were clear.

adequate warning
hearing before

As Mr. Siler x^as the only

3 called by the Respondants or Mr. Rousay, the issues were only clear
tfr. Siler had testified.
The Court will note that Mr. Rousay requested a contunuance so
i could bring witnesses in to controvert the opinions of Mr. Siler.
is ay was not permitted to summon Wayne Clegg, but stipulated to the
: of itfhat occured, only to qualify Mr. Rousay's testimony of what
i by prefacing Mr. Rousay's account with supposedly'1.
Moreover, Mr. Rousay has never been informed of what was at risk here.
The Commission claims that "testimony clearly demonstrates the other
luals contracintg with the plaintiff worked under identical contracts...
:form their services in a similar manner to Mr. Siler.:
If such a conclusion were true, how is it that Mr. siler could
id fire others and not himself?

Was everyone an office manager too?

>ryone at some time in their relationship with Mr. Rousay function as

7

.liveryman cont actor, ueicp
heir own T
ocumenT

unit?

The record indicates the opposite is true. While the

2 other elements of the relationship were often the same, there

,s f 1 * ^dence to support the Commissions conclusions that the relationships
*ere essentially the same.
It is allleged that MR. Siler functioned as an "office manager dui
evening shift."

The Commission failed to establish that Mr. Siler function*

Ln this capacity because he hired and fired his own people

and established

:ontrol over them himself.
The transcripts clearly show that there was not such a concept or
thing as an evening shift as there was no time requirement for anyone to fun
at a particular location at a specified time of day.

Thus, Mr. SilerTs clai

is clearly questionable.
It is alleged that Mr. Siler received morezcompensation for
his servces as manager for a period of !,two to three months".

The compensa

record, however, shows that Mr. Siler actually received less compensation t
before.

Mr. Siler stopped his personal production efforts or curtailed th

to manage a larger prospecting effort.
The record also shows tht Mr. Siler actually did the Lnterviewii
and the firing of personnel

both before and after the alleged date oi

starting to function as manager or director of the employing unit*
The Commission failed to demonstrate that the employing unit wa
that of Mr. Rousay.

Mr. Rousay did not

hire and fire. Mr. Rousay merely

programs, assisted the entrepreneur on request, and provided only those
resources that the entrepreneur asked.

8

Mr. Siler, however, declared hims

Jig unit.

M r . Rousay aia n e g o t i a t e a larger percentage of the receipts
:. Siler.
own.

This w a s done t o p e r m i t M r . Siler to develop an organization

T h e fact that M r . Siler d i d n o t perform telephone solicitn or

ries for other businesses or f o r himself during the alleged period of
lent is patently false.

T h e record cl ear] y shows that M r . Siler also

1 as a driver for U t e Cab during this period of tine.

The record also

that M r , Siler operated in a b r o a d capacity as director of h i s o w n
Lng unit during period in w h i c h h e 1 s a"11 pQ-PH t n t is-7^ hoQT

om^i ^ 0 ;

THE A L J A N D T H E COMMISSION H A V E DEMONSTRATED EXTREME
ECE A N D INSENSITIVITY T O M R . R O U S A Y f S CIVIL R I G H T S , A N D IN SO
SAVE V I O L A T E D T H E RULES OF P R O C E D U R E A N D D U E P R O C E S S , AND THERE
3E CONCLUSIONS O F T H E COMMISSION SHOULD B E OVERTURNED.

rot ^rr

4j-

n

The duty to determine the facts has been delegated to the
The realistic interpretation of the facts and circumstances in evidence 'is
essentail to the successful operation of thep&&nr.--.7'. In its search for the
ard has the rights to consider the interest of the witness(s); the probabili
Drbability of his insertions In liqht of proved or admitted facts; the
L sitation as shown by
all the^surrounding circumstances; the conditons
tfhich the witness acted and unde&which he testified; his prejudices, if any;
sire; his apparent forthrightness or lack thereof; and many other factors."
In the present case, Mr. Siler!s claim Is subject to denial
is not supported by competent and substantial evidence and in the
B of fraud, ... (emphasis mi ne.)
The bi irden ] i es with the claimant to demonstrate that he Is entitle d
benefits claimed. (Block vs. Kinder, 338 Mo. *099, 93 SV; 2c 932;
vs. Crown Coach Company,

348 Mo. 1 2 ^ ; ;,. .

-: -bi, ^c\)

I n g e n e r a .1 t h e f I n d I n g s c • f f a c t: b y 11 I e C o m m I s s I o n s h a 1 ] t e

sive and the j r i s d i c t i o n of the said court s h a l l be confined to Questions

law.

However, as can be shown in this case, the facts presented as argumenr

: the conclusions of the Commission are improbable ( reversal) Mr.
Ler's willingness to engage in entrepreneurai activity, the single tiindec
:ent cf the Employment Security to badger and harass Mr. Rousay (eventhough
had been "acquitted" of employer status before), the extreme prejudice of
Byrd and Mr. Evans in failing to exercise their due diligence to determine
egibility, and failing to note

the malleability of the claimant to

ading and coaching during the application process and even during the
amenation and cross examination.
Of no less concern is the forging of Mr. Siler1s signature by
. Evans on '*£)$£. only document submitted as a declarationof unemployment by
s "employed status".
egibility,

Mr. Siler not only failed to demonstrate his

the ALJ refused to permit such an examination on grounds it

.s not relevant to Mr. RousayTs alleged liability for unemployment ccntributic
The charter of the ALJ is to get at the truth.

This supposes that

le ALJ will consider facts and arguments on BOTH sides of an issue. There
i no evidence in the finds of fact that the ALJ made any effort to
ibpoena the personal records or documents of Mr. Siler, verify his eligibility
r challenge the information presented on his application for benefits. Yet,
le ALJ seems willing to overlook the badgering, harrassment, and annoyance
t the appellant, eventhough the appellant had been found not an employer
i previous occasions.
If the Court should rule against the
et a precedent with dire consequences.

appellant, the Court would

Not only would this case serve

o warrant a reckless and wanton abuse of investigative authority and
owers of the Industrial Commission, but it would undermine the obligation

1 their responsibility of objectively examining both sides of an
to get an the truth.
For example, the A L J , in his findings of fact, and conclusions of
d order, offered no explanation for rejecting Mr. Pvousay T s explanation
relationship, and yet under cross examination, tha t not only is
t 9 signed by someone other than the applicant, but that the applicant
es every statement on the form.

This implies undue influence on Mr.

This reasonable conclusion seems to have slipped by the ALJ.

No

able or prudent individual would fail to take note of questionable
validity c: £212 Sixer's eligibility.
es Mr. S i l e - ! - e~:_-;,-: :'

:

-

•- r.ny

Yet the ALJ patently
.

.-. _-c,

r_, and

s to pursue the matter further!
This is a patent violation of his charter to examine such issues,
si der the va] i dity of evidence, and to challenge" sour ces of information.
only failed to examine, he seems to take a proactive role in getting
Dnable evidence into the r e c o r d

He asserts that- he will take such

*s into consi derati on, bi it i n tl le cone] usions of 1 aw and order,
I to note — e v e n mention in p a s s i n g — t h i s central issue in his
lent.
Sommerville, vs Industrial Commission, Utah, (196 P. (2) 71S H 9 4 8 ) ,
ipreme Court held that a map, injure,: while attempting to repair
ib.. i-

: c. *offte .-.v:

.

....:.:.= . to compensation (though he

emp loyee and not an in depend en t contract o r) s i n c e h i s w o r k w a s h e J c
outside the usual trade, b u s i n e s s , or occupation of his employer.
iplovee was not considered within the nrotection of the Act because

e nature of the work, he engaged in was not sufficiently "parallel"
the general nature of the work performed by the usual employees of
.e coffee shop.
The distinction between casual and usual employment is made in
in Mc Donald v. Dunn Construction Co., Tenn. 185 S. W. (2)
,7 (1945).

In Mc Donald v. Dunn, the Court held that an employee

is not. "casual" if the work he performed wre in the usual course of
rade, business, profession or occupation of his employer.

By this

itionale, then, the individual who engages in functions, or activities
lich resemble , or parallel his former occupation or career, he wold
i easily perceived to engage in ninon-casualn or his "usual" type
f employment.
Mr. Siler was a vehicle driver.

Based on his employment record

\-* v-U (b*T \ D ) , Mr. Siler usually engaged in the business of
elivery or vehicle driving for compensation or hire.

It was his

sual activity or work to perform such activities as moving cargo or
aking deliveries.
ype of work.

In .this sense, his certainly within his usual

He, in fact, maintained an Chauffeur D license which

ermitted him to operate vehicles of virtually unlimited size (except
hose requiring special permits suchas school buses).

At it would

urprise no one who knew him to see that upon self-termination he
aediately went to work as a Cab Driver.

Thus, there is a consistent pattern

it Mr. Siler, as a self-employed, independent contractor, continued to
iction in his usual business or carerr, or trade as a vehicle operator,
is point was glossed-over by the Commission in their ruling.

\2_

Commission argues that he had never performed such work before, and
efore, his functioning as a solicitor was not in the usual course of
work.
Since the activity of solicitation was in no way similar
peating a vehicle, such activity, was therefore, non-traditional
Linusai for him, and therefore, he is regarded to be an employee—not
operating or managing
e of an established, independent business as an independent contractor,
therefore must be considered more an employee skasxs self-employed.
Here again, the Commission lost sight of the central issue.
is declared intention of becoming a telephone solicitor, and by his
ging in entrepreneurial activities associated with this solicitation,
as, ]'} wertheless ? self-employed.

There is a clear precedent for this

of radical change in an individual's life.

It Is not unusal for

ons to make abrupt career changes when they feel they can no longer
their perbcnai goals in onier forms of employemtn.
When Mr. Slier approached Mr. Rousay for a:; cr>?rr—\- '*
tion as a self-employed, independent contractor, and indicated
'was his declared Intent, ( \ix\o»
ly a vehicle operator.

^ ":>) > Mr. S: ler became, no longer

He crossed the line from servant, and employee

thers, to master and eventually, employer of others.

Within a fewT

t months Mr. Slier established himself to be a capable, i f not
ly successful manager *: h.

«w

level of Income ( V ;

~ negotiated for <:;:: increase percentage

'

tie business ( i=-xi» \ I::> i ** •:

nip] oyi ng i mi 1:

He negoti ated hi s

..,.- .urea ana iii. :• others as an employer.

\3

, -.
. _.
.,v^r»
by cei
in it
ion, wtien

an

maiviaua± oecomes an inaenenaent:

itractor, and behaves with autonomy as a self-employed manager of
3 won employing unit, he cannot be held to be "within" the usual
ade, or career or activity, or occupation of another business associate
cause, as self-employed, he cannot be employed by another. Since he
anot be employed by another, he cannot be construed to be "within"
e usual function of another.
Since he was not within the "business" of Mr. Pvousay, he cannon
considered to be an employee of Mr. Rous ay from the standpoint of
egible for benefits.

Just as the Supreme Court held that the man

jured in the rpair of a gable at the coffee shop where he was employed,
was nevertheless, not compensated, because his activities were outside
e usual function of his duty to someone else.

In essence, the Court

led he was "doing his own thing."
In the

same sense, Mr. Siler, eventhough he is adjudged to

an "employee" because he is not and "independnet contractor" (fallacious
still
gument) Mr. Siler would not be qulified as a claimant for unemployment
nefits, because, by his own declared intent, he had decided to do his
wn thing."

(£XHI6»»

\*>) .

In light of the Court's findings in

mmerville, therfore, Mr. Siler should have never been granted benefits
d this case should have never come before the Court.

The Commission

red in failing to understand the reasoning ofthe Court in this matter
d seems to have an understanding outside the context of case law.
The reason the Commission seems to miss these central points
.g. Mr. Siler!s declared self intent to be an indpenent contractor,

:unctioning as an entrepreneur, his self-employment, his never
lg n.;"-iwe to Mr. Rousay of 1 lis termination) is that they are seemingl
:cupied with "making their case" against Mi :. Roi isay—i lot in ex ami ning
: acceptance of liability for Mr. Siler's claim.
On the other

hand, it may be argued that Mr. Siier's excursion

telephone solicitation was not within his usual course of business
reer, and therefore, the period for which he claimed unemployment
its is not compensable under the Employment Security Act, because the
hone solicitation was "casual" according to definitions put forth
ling on Mc Donald v. Dunn, and Sommerville V. the INdustrial Commission.
sence, the Commission fails to make its argument in either case.

It

rfectly clear from the findings of fact that the claimant changed
sual pattern of employment as a v^h::'!e " ~ r = -**-. ond declaring
ntent to be an independent contractor, engaged in entrepreneural
ity, free from the control <.. : the Appellant.

When this entrepreneurial

re failed to pan ci it f or Mr. S1 1 eer, 1 le simply 'walked away.

Theref u: e

ssociation with Mr. Rousay was both "casual" and non-compensable in
ramework of the Employment Security Act.
Benefits should never have been, granted Mr. Siler.

The efforts

Id Mr. Rousay liable for unemployment compensation should therefore
uncated, as it has in the past in other
d be p^r.-iL".

-

> uii abn .

hearings and Mr, Rousay

. ^..siness and providing lor ;ns

y without the incessant badgering of the Einp] oyment Sea rri ty Di vision.

I5

"he ruling cf the Industrial Commission should be reversec a no all
actions against Mr. Rcusay cismissed.
State Officials have ccschec the only witness, colluded in preparing
what appears tc be a fraudulent application (76-6-503. 76-S-1C1, 76-5-412.
76-S-^i^, 76-5-511.) ana brca.cened Siler's case (which is unique by aLr.cs"
any legal stancaru) tc include ether allegea (un-nair.ee employees).
"When the State cia present its argument that Mr. Rcussy was an employ*
Kr. Rcusay was uenieu the opportunity to subpoena records and witnesses
Cne of the points plaintiff raises on appeal is that his due process
rishts "were violated when the administrative Lsw judge at the hearing
belcw refused plaintiff's right to call witnesses cf his own.

Specificaii

the administrative law jucge refused to issue subpoena requiring the atxer
cf Wavne Cleeg, an employee cf the Industrial Commission.

Although defenc

brief states that "Mr. Clegg had no know ledge cf facts which were materia,
to the issues of the case,,; the reccrc Indicate otherwise.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-4--11 (197^ &Supp. 1987), The
Industrial Commission is charged with the duty 'to administer the Fmployme
Security Act, and in light of such and under the facts of this case, the
administrative law judge erred in precluding testimony and record evidenc
regarding Clegg1s conduct and involvement in the case.
To rule against Kr. Rousay would establish a shocking precedent of
setting aside contracts between two consenting adults, who by agreement ;
mutually at risk, who declare themselves to be independent contractors,
furthermore,.the State would condone the violation of private businessme
permit the harassment of individuals, and deny them Constitutional rio-ht

5 S t a i e would n i s ^ i ' x t i p \,L <;cac::i::j ci w i t n e s s e s t •permit q u e s t i o n a b l e
mments t o a d m i t t e d a s E x h i b i t s , ( E x h i b i t 9 ) .
S i i e r : o f u l l r e c o r d t o be

Theugh S t a t e O f f i c i a l s would no- allow Yr.
DDoenaei:, arid ot::e.r w i t n e s s e s t o t e s t i f y en
m s c r i r r t s c l e a r l y n o i n t tr.n-

v

^

-: :;_-•• - --

i t h e r e f o r e could not be employee.
.

n9ver

„-.-.--..

r,

r

,ci5^^rs behalf,

••-.:. --/::; j.<v/r<

-•.•?..

the
. enrolover,

Since he ccuic n e t be employee, :: s

e l i g i b l e f o r unemployment b e n e f i t s .

>se a c t i o n s F u e::-

v

Sines S l i e r was never e l i g i b l e ,

•- ;:_:\ . .-

r"\

The fact that they h?ve, witn zuc;: ea_j.cus disregard for Mr. ?„eussyfs
hts, clearly shews an attitude so arbitrary ana capricious ?s to be
iber-^-e harassment,

' •'

•

•

The conclusion of the Industrial Commissien should reversed sne all
ions against Kr. Rcusay should be dismissed immediately so that he
irarci- . remedy sgams": t:icse *i u n 7e so brazenly wronged him.

pectiuiiy submitted this 6th day of January, 1988.
Richard
Pro Se

RCIUSP,/

/

